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Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may
harm those who are not so favoured. Other papers have produced ev-
idence consistent with the presence of such favouritism but have been
unable to consider methods for controlling it. We address this issue
in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer, where one
particular league introduced professional referees in 2001-02, thereby
changing the ﬁnancial incentives and monitoring regime faced by these
referees. Because the change was not eﬀected in all leagues, the ‘ex-
periment’ has both cross-sectional and intertemporal dimensions. We
study the eﬀects of professional referees on an established measure of
referee bias: length of injury time in close matches. We ﬁnd that refer-
ees exercised favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards,
having controlled for selection and soccer-wide eﬀects. The results are
consistent with a ﬁnancial incentive eﬀect as a result of professional
referees and indicate that subtle aspects of principal-agent relation-
ships (such as favouritism) are amenable to contractual inﬂuence.
JEL number: D8, J2, J44
Keywords: Favouritism, ﬁnancial incentives, soccer, referee.
∗We are grateful to Nick Emler, Ron Smith and seminar participants at the Institute
of Education (University of London) for valuable comments; the British Academy (under
award SG-35463) for ﬁnancial support; and to Rachel Trimmings for research assistance.
Any errors are our own.1 Introduction
A central tenet of principal-agent theory is that a combination of ﬁnancial
rewards and (imperfect) monitoring can be used by principals to incentivise
their agents. In particular, the purpose of such instruments is to have the
agent (at the expense of some information rent) internalise the principal’s
preferences when performing his/her tasks. A literature, has developed to
test the extent to which such incentive contracts perform the roles they are
designed for. The papers here are well summarised in Prendergast (1999) and
cover settings as diverse as executive compensation schemes and the cost of
legal aid in England and Wales (Gray et al. (1999)).
Recent work has highlighted an additional source of ineﬃciency in principal-
agent relationships: the favouritism that principals can show towards chosen
agents. In theory, this can inﬂuence numerous economic settings. Thus,
Prendergast and Topel (1996) show how favouritism can bias the evalua-
tion of agents’ performance in organisations and, in turn, their behaviour.
Similarly, large-scale public expenditure decisions can be aﬄicted by such
behaviour: for example, the choice of procurement partner by government
departments (Naegelen and Mougeot (1998)) and the regional allocation of
public goods in the presence of political bias (Zantman (2002)). In fact, it
seems likely that most people will recognise circumstances where favouritism
has (or could have) been exercised by principals and this raises the important
question of how such behaviour may be controlled.1
A potential answer to this question may be to use ﬁnancial incentives.
Such a possibility arises when (as is often the case) the principals favour-
1“Control” of favouritism is a more appropriate objective than its eradication: as Pren-
dergast and Topel (1996) show, to the extent that parties enjoy exercising favouritism, its
eradication removes a source of welfare.
1ing particular agents are, themselves, agents to a higher principal who may
wish to control such behaviour. For example, Prendergast and Topel (1996)
model the favouritism exercised by “supervisors” towards “workers” in a
manager-supervisor-worker hierarchy. They show that the “managers” can
use ﬁnancial incentives to control supervisors’ favouritism. Inspired by this
insight, the current paper provides the ﬁrst test (to our knowledge) of the
extent to which ﬁnancial incentives can help control favouritism in such hier-
archical principal-agent settings. In particular, we ask whether a governing
body in soccer can inﬂuence the favouritism displayed by referees towards
players/teams.
Empirical studies of favouritism in general are limited by the diﬃcult task
of its identiﬁcation but soccer has recently proved a fruitful setting for such
analysis.2 Garicano et al. (2004) ﬁnd evidence that soccer referees favour
home teams when adjudicating matches. Using data from Spanish soccer,
the authors ﬁnd that referees add more injury time when the home team is
behind in a close game than when it is ahead in a close game (as opposed to
those where the scores are too far apart for additional injury time to make a
diﬀerence). They attribute this “favouritism” to the social pressure applied
by home team supporters. The evident measurability of this favouritism
has encouraged several similar studies based on other soccer leagues. Using
additional control variables, Dohmen (2003), Sutter and Kocher (2004) and
Lucey and Power (2004) all produce a qualitatively similar ﬁnding on injury
time to Garicano et al. (2004)’s in German, Italian and US soccer leagues
respectively. In addition, Dohmen (2003) and Sutter and Kocher (2004) also
discover that referees are more inclined to award penalty kicks for the home
2Favouritism has also received empirical examination in used car markets (Knowles
et al. (2001): racial bias) and, indeed, in academic publishing (Medoﬀ (2003): editorial
bias).
2team as opposed to the away team (see also Nevill et al. (1996)). Finally,
Nevill et al. (2002) use a series of controlled experiments with video-taped
matches and actual referees to show that crowd noise can inﬂuence refereeing
decisions.3
To perform our analysis, we make use of a natural experiment that took
place in English soccer in 2001-02. This season saw the introduction of pro-
fessional referees to the English Premier League.4 For the ﬁrst time, a group
of referees were retained for the whole soccer season on a full salary (plus
match fees) and, in addition, were subjected to a new regime of monitor-
ing and performance appraisal. Along with the intertemporal comparison
in performance that this provides, the fact that only the Premier League
(in contrast to the leagues below it) introduced this change means that the
natural experiment also contains a cross-sectional dimension.
Like the papers cited above, we ﬁrst establish the presence of favouritism
in our data using Garicano et al. (2004)’s approach: looking for the ﬁrst
time at the relationship between injury time and home team match position
in close games for English soccer. We discover favouritism similar to (though
smaller than) Garicano et al. (2004)’s in the pre-professional English Premier
League. Interestingly, although other authors have interpreted the degree of
favouritism as representing the extent of social pressure exerted by home
team fans, our result need not in fact imply a lack of such pressure. With
average distances between grounds smaller in England than Spain and the
3The presence of home bias amongst sports referees has received attention from a
variety of disciplines (see the surveys in Courneya and Carron (1992) and Nevill and
Holder (1999)); while psychologists and health scientists have uncovered a number of
potential causes of such behaviour (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Wickens and
Hollands (2000) and Neave and Wolfson (2003)). More generally, economists have also
discussed the interaction between ‘social’ factors and market outcomes (e.g. Becker and
Murphy (2000)).
4See NCCFR (2002) for the reasons behind this change.
3US (where larger biases have been found), most matches contain a larger pro-
portion of away team supporters who might, themselves, apply a measure of
countervailing social pressure.5 However, we ﬁnd that favouritism disappears
in our post-professional Premier League data: this suggests a clear response
to the incentives introduced by the policy.6
We address two possible arguments that could contradict this conclusion.
First, it could be argued that we are picking up a ‘quality’ eﬀect in the sense
that the best referees are used in the Premier League and, as such, they are
best able to ignore tendencies towards favouritism. Our use of ﬁxed eﬀects
controls for this selection bias but does not remove the eﬀect we ﬁnd from
professionalism. Second, it may be that (for whatever reason) the reductions
in score-dependent injury time that we ﬁnd could have happened across En-
glish professional soccer in general; again, this would limit the extent to
which ﬁnancial incentives were controlling favouritism. As noted above, we
are able to use contemporaneous data from the English First Division (as it
was called during our data period) and this allows us to control for such a
soccer-wide eﬀect. Again, our conclusion still holds.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section provides more
detail on the switch to professional referees that underlies our natural ex-
periment. Section 3 then presents our data and descriptive statistics before
5The lower levels of favouritism in Italy (Lucey and Power (2004)) could also be ex-
plained in a similar way.
6Of the papers cited earlier, Garicano et al. (2004) are clear that their paper examines
only “non-monetary incentives” (p. 11) and this is also true in Sutter and Kocher (2004).
Dohmen (2003) uses German data over nine seasons in which he reports increases in the
fees paid to referees but he does not seek to identify any relationship between fee rises
and levels of bias. In fact, the changes in bias that he does observe are not systematic).
Lucey and Power (2004) note smaller levels of bias in Italy than the US and imply that
this may be related to the higher ﬁnancial rewards for referees in the former. Neither of
these papers provides a satisfactory basis for examining the role of ﬁnancial incentives in
controlling favouritism: what is needed is an explicit exogenous change in the ﬁnancial
incentives faced by referees such as the one we examine.
4Section 4 sets out our results. The concluding section discusses our results
and suggests extensions to our work.
2 Professional soccer referees
Referees (along with two assistants) oﬃciate at all soccer games. Their task
is to adjudicate incidents according to rules laid down by the Federation of
International Football Associations (FIFA), to apply appropriate sanctions
when they deem these rules have been broken, and to time proceedings so
that 90 minutes of play (in two halves of 45 minutes) take place—this will
typically require additional time to compensate for stoppages resulting from,
say, player injuries, player substitutions and time wasting by the players.
During the game, the referee is the sole adjudicator of infringements and
exercises considerable discretion when interpreting players’ actions and de-
ciding appropriate responses.
When referees turned professional in 2001, the Professional Game Match
Oﬃcials Board (PGMOB) replaced the National Review Board. Its task was
to provide match oﬃcials for all professional games played in England and to
assess their performance throughout the season. Oﬃcials were divided into
two broad groups. First, the Select Group, currently comprising 19 referees
and 38 assistant referees, oﬃciate at the top games including all those in the
English Premier League.7 Second, the National List of oﬃcials includes over
two hundred individuals as referees and assistant referees who oﬃciate in the
remaining professional game ﬁxtures.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant change introduced by professional referees
7These referees also oﬃciate at some Football League games and certain FA Cup and
League Cup games.
5related to their remuneration. Prior to the 2001-02 season, referees were
employed as amateurs and earned as little as a few hundred pounds per
game (plus expenses)—see NCCFR (2002). They also received little training.
In contrast, professional referees received an annual retainer fee of £33,000
plus £900 per game and were obliged to attend a number of training sessions
organised by the PGMOB. Most referees also work in other professions during
the week.
The new professional status of referees was inevitably combined with
increased scrutiny of their performances. Measures to introduce greater ac-
countability included (i) fortnightly meetings to discuss examples of good
and bad refereeing practice, (ii) monitoring from the stands and reports from
managers and Professional Footballers Association representatives, and (iii)
intensive training and stringent ﬁtness tests designed to ensure that referees
could perform to the best of their ability. Referees deemed to have performed
poorly face a number of sanctions, the ultimate one being either temporary
or permanent removal from the professional list, with associated implications
for income and status.8
To summarise, soccer referees exercise considerable discretion when oﬃ-
ciating games and this may encourage favouritism in their decision making.
Top-level referees in England and Wales have recently received a signiﬁcant
increase in the remuneration they receive, coupled with improved monitoring
of their performances. To the extent that this policy implies a credible, and
high, opportunity cost to making poor decisions, it might be expected to
have reduced scope for favouritism amongst top referees. The remainder of
the paper seeks to test this conjecture. We begin by presenting our data.
8For instance, referee Andy D’Urso received a 28-day ban in September 2004 for incor-
rectly sanctioning a player.
63 Data
At the level of professional soccer players (as opposed to referees), English
soccer is divided into four national leagues. We have data from the top two
of these: the Premier League (whose referees became professional in 2001-
02) and, below this, the First Division (whose referees remained ‘amateur’).9
The former consists of twenty teams who play each other home and away
during a season (yielding a total of 38 matches per team); the latter consists
of twenty-four teams, again playing each other home and away (meaning 46
matches per team in a season). Each season, three teams are relegated from
the Premier League to the First Division, with three teams being promoted
in the opposite direction and three teams also being relegated from the First
Division. Thus, as the season progresses, matches develop added signiﬁcance.
For every match in these two leagues (for the seasons 1999-00 and 2002-
03), we have data on the goals scored by home and visiting teams, the injury
time added by the referee at the end of the ﬁrst and second halves of play,
sanctions handed out by referees to players for infringements of the rules
(‘yellow cards’ for moderate infringements and ‘red cards’ for signiﬁcant in-
fringements10), crowd attendance ﬁgures and the names of referees who were
in charge of each game. These data come from the Press Association. In ad-
dition, we also have information on the timing of goals scored in injury time
in the Premier League (from Opta Index). Equivalent data are not available
for the First Division; instead, goals occurring in or after the ﬁnal minute of
each half are timed at either 45 or 90 minutes. We assume that goals recorded
9Since August 2004, the First Division has been called the Championship but, as our
data pre-date this change of name, we refer to it throughout by its previous name.
10Two yellow cards constitute a red card which, in turn, means a player’s ejection from
the game and his side’s numbers being reduced accordingly for the remainder of the game.
7in this way in the First Division are injury time goals.11 The data on the
remaining variables come from several sources. Player substitutions during
each game come from the www.soccerbase.com website. Annual turnover
measures for Premier League clubs were gathered from annual balance sheets
and proﬁt and loss accounts lodged with Companies House. Table rankings
of home teams at the end of the season and ground capacity were collected
from relevant Rothman’s Football Yearbooks.
Before proceeding to discuss our results, it is useful to consider our choice
of seasons for analysis (1999-00 and 2002-03). Clearly, it is important for us
that these seasons span the onset of professional Premier League referees (in
2001-02). By not using the seasons immediately before and after the new
professional referee era, we aim to avoid potential anticipation eﬀects (in
2000-01) and disequilibrium responses (in 2001-02). Accordingly, we believe
our data are suitable for distinguishing the ‘steady-state’ eﬀects of profes-
sional referees.
Tables 1A and 1B provide summary statistics for the variables used in
this analysis over the seasons 1999-00 and 2002-03 and in the Premiership
and First Division, respectively. The data cover 760 Premier League matches
(i.e. 20 teams playing 19 home games in each of two seasons) and 1,104 First
Division games (i.e. 24 × 23× 2). Both tables display similar patterns, with
a little quantitative diﬀerence. Thus, in both leagues, home teams won on
average (by nearly half a goal in the Premier League, and just over a third
of a goal in the First Division). In both cases, home teams scored roughly
11Our Opta Index data show that ninety per cent of goals timed at either 45 or 90
minutes in the Premier League in the 1999-00 season were scored during injury time. This
compares with 70 per cent in the 2002-03 season. Thus, our assumption for the First
Division is likely to be reasonable. It is certainly implausible that most goals timed at 45
or 90 minutes were scored at precisely that time, with only a small number being scored
in injury time.
81.5. goals per game, with visitors netting a little over one. Second-half injury
time produced more goals for home and away teams in both leagues. In part,
this reﬂected the longer duration of second-half injury time. First Division
injury time was longer than in the Premier League, reﬂecting in part the
slightly higher number of player substitutions in that league. Furthermore,
home teams scored more goals in both ﬁrst- and second-half injury time, in
both leagues. As might be expected for the higher proﬁle league with larger
clubs, Premier League attendances averaged more than twice those in First
Division, with grounds almost 90% full; First Division grounds were roughly
two-thirds full.
4 Results
The exogenous change of rewards to referees in the Premier League in the
2001-02 season, presents a unique opportunity of testing whether referees
respond to ﬁnancial incentives. In Table 2 we test for this using speciﬁcations
very similar to those used in Garicano et al. (2004). The dependent variable
is second half injury time in games where the goal diﬀerence is one; i.e. games
that are ‘close’ in the sense that their outcome could be altered by a few more
seconds of play. As in Garicano et al. (2004), favouritism is captured by the
coeﬃcient on the SCORE DIFFERENCE dummy which is equal to one if
the home team is ahead by one goal and zero if the home team is behind
by one goal. The estimated coeﬃcient on this dummy reported in column
(i) is negative, small in magnitude but strongly signiﬁcant (i.e. at 1%). On
average, injury time is shorter by 18 seconds, substantially lower than the
estimate of 1.88 minutes in Garicano et al. (2004). However, as columns
(ii)–(iv) in Table 2 indicate, the presence of additional regressors increases
9our measured favouritism to roughly 30 seconds, in each case with strong
statistical signiﬁcance.12
In columns (ii)–(iv) in Table 2 we test for the change in ﬁnancial rewards
of referees by including interaction terms between the YEAR of observa-
tion and the SCORE DIFFERENCE dummy. The interaction term SCORE
DIFFERENCE × YEAR is positive and signiﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃ-
cients roughly oﬀset those on SCORE DIFFERENCE, suggesting that the
favouritism of roughly 30 seconds is more-or-less removed after the intro-
duction of professional referees. This is consistent with the introduction of
professional referees generating strong enough ﬁnancial incentives to inﬂu-
ence referees’ behaviour.13
There are two important concerns with the results discussed above. First,
perhaps the highest quality referees are oﬀered professional contracts, in
which case, we might simply be picking up a selection bias as opposed to
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives per se. We address this issue by employing
referee ﬁxed eﬀects in column (iv) of Table 2. Thus, the results reported
above ultimately control for potential quality eﬀects.
12It should be noted from Tables 1A and 1B that measured injury time itself is also
lower in our data than in Garicano et al. (2004)’s. This partially explains the lower
amount of favouritism that we ﬁnd. As mentioned in the Introduction, is it also likely
that the greater preponderance of away team supporters at English games (as a result of
shorter travel distances) exert a social pressure to counter that postulated by Garicano
et al. (2004).
13We have also looked at whether the ‘closeness’ of a game matters. For example, we
ﬁnd that the SCORE DIFFERENCE dummy is small and statistically insigniﬁcant when
there is a two-goal diﬀerence in the score at the end of the second half. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the evidence in Garicano et al. (2004) and contributes to the view that the
diﬀerences in injury time are related to the prospects that they can alter match outcomes.
To investigate further the issue of favouritism, we have also tested whether referees end
the game quicker after a home goal is scored in injury time than an away goal. In the
Premier league during the 1999-00 and 2002-03 seasons, there were 77 games in which
either the home team or the away team scored one goal in second half injury time. We
found no evidence to suggest that the amount of injury time depended on who scored.
This is in contrast to the ﬁndings in Garicano et al. (2004).
10The second important concern relates to the fact that the professional ref-
eree group does not cover other leagues, so that the reduction in favouritism
we have found may simply reﬂect a trend across all of English football. A par-
ticular strength of our data is that we are able to use First Division matches
as a control group (given that referees here remained amateur) in order to
control for such a ‘soccer-wide’ eﬀect.
Table 3 presents basic statistics on average injury time in games which
ended with a one goal diﬀerence before and after the introduction of profes-
sional referees, across the two football leagues. The top two rows in Table 3
show the eﬀect of professional referees on ﬁrst half injury time in the Premier
League, in which the employment of professional referees was an innovation
relative to the pre-2001-02 season, and the control group (First Division), in
which they were not. Average ﬁrst half injury time with the treatment group
(Premier League) decreased by a statistically signiﬁcant 0.205 minutes (from
1.926 to 1.721). However, for the control group (First Division) there was
an increase of 0.206 minutes. Our ﬁrst estimate of the injury time response
then is -0.411, with a standard error of 0.163. Looking still further down
Table 3 to the comparison of second half injury time in the Premier League
and the First Division, a similar pattern emerges. Injury time before 2001
was 2.874 minutes in Premier League games, compared with 3.083 minutes
for the First Division. After 2001 there was an increase in injury time of 0.41
minutes (2.874 to 3.284) for the Premier League. There was a 0.724 increase
in minutes for the control group. Taken together, these ﬁgures suggest a
response of -0.314 minutes. On balance, then, the unconditional diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimates in Table 3 point to a fall in injury time added by
referees when professional in the Premier League compared to the control
group of the First Division.
11Table 4 moves to a regression framework, employing the straightforward
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation. The dependent variable
is the length of injury time in games that ended with a one goal diﬀerence.
The PREMIER LEAGUE dummy variable is equal to 1 for games in the
Premiership and 0 for games in the First Division. Favouritism is again
captured by the SCORE DIFFERENCE dummy variable, which equals 1 if
the home team is ahead by one goal and 0 if the home team is behind by one
goal. YEAR denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-professional
referee period (2002-03 season) and 0 for games in the pre-professional period
(1999-00 season). The coeﬃcients of central interest in Table 4 are those on
the triple interaction term, PREMIER LEAGUE × SCORE DIFFERENCE
× YEAR. The coeﬃcient measures the change between the pre- and post-
professional referee periods in Premier League compared to First Division
second half injury time in games when the home team is leading by one goal.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the preliminary ﬁndings in Table
2. As the coeﬃcients on PREMIER LEAGUE × SCORE DIFFERENCE
show, on average injury time is shorter in the Premiership by roughly 25
seconds when the home team is ahead by one goal. However, the introduction
of professional referees had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on second half injury
time in the Premier League compared to the First Division. In terms of
magnitude, the estimated marginal eﬀect of professional referees on second
half injury time in the Premier League compared to First Division is 0.633
in column (i), 0.591 in column (ii) and 0.593 in column (iii)—i.e. something
in the order or 35 seconds; these estimates are consistent with favouritism
being removed after the introduction of professional referees.
125 Conclusions
While existing literature has searched for favouritism in a number of principal-
agent settings, we believe our paper is the ﬁrst to examine the extent to which
such behaviour may be controlled; in our case by ﬁnancial incentives. The
paper’s main contribution is to present evidence consistent with such control.
In so doing, we also complement existing evidence suggesting that soccer ref-
erees may exercise their discretion in ways that favour home teams; in our
case, by presenting data from the top two divisions of English soccer. It is
worth being clear that, in a multi-million pound high-proﬁle sport like soccer,
such favouritism is of more than academic interest: promotion, relegation,
prize money for league placings and players’ careers could all be at stake,
in principle, if soccer games are not oﬃciated to high standards of objectiv-
ity. Our results are therefore important in indicating that principals may
control their agents by appropriate and, in some sense, intuitive means. Of
course, they are also important in a growing literature that has highlighted
the potential for favourisitsm in principal-agent relationships.
Our results raise the question of whether ﬁnancial incentives could con-
trol favouritism which occurred on a larger scale than that we have found.
As pointed out in the paper, the smaller extent of favouritism in England
may be the result of similar social pressure to that identiﬁed by Garicano
et al. (2004), with the diﬀerence that the presence of larger proportions of
‘away’ supporters (partially) oﬀsets that applied by ‘home’ fans. It might
be conjectured that, in this slightly more ‘even’ setting, referees may not
need signiﬁcant additional incentives to alter their behaviour. As such, the
ﬁnancial incentives associated with becoming professional were suﬃcient. It
would be interesting to see whether larger examples of favouritism can be
controlled in a similar way; unfortunately, we are unaware of natural exper-
13iments like the one we study in countries where soccer referees appear to
exhibit more favouritism.
An interesting question raised by our results is the extent to which pro-
fessional referees have increased welfare in English football. Of course, to the
extent that home teams now receive less ‘favours’ from referees, we have not
identiﬁed a Pareto improving policy. However, one might argue that some of
the costs of tackling favouritism identiﬁed by Prendergast and Topel (1996)
are not present in our setting. In particular, because referees negotiated the
professional package before signing up to it, a revealed preference argument
might suggest that they have been compensated for the loss of welfare associ-
ated with being less able to exercise discretion. If so, then the wider beneﬁts
of impartiality and objectivity that we have identiﬁed might be said to imply
a positive welfare eﬀect from professional referees.
We note that our results could be further strengthened by data on refer-
ees’ earnings outside football (which would inﬂuence the opportunity cost of
being removed from the professional referees’ list) and on referees’ individ-
ual characteristics. Perhaps understandably, referees and their professional
association, are protective of such data and we have (so far) been unable to
generate consistent observations for such controls.
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16Table 1A:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PREMIER LEAGUE SAMPLE 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Score difference  760  0.461  1.721  -6  8 
Score home   760  1.586  1.289  0  8 
Score visitor  760  1.125  1.098  0  6 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1
st half home 
760 0.036  0.185 0  1 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2
nd half home 
760 0.068  0.258 0  2 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1
st half visitor 
760 0.015  0.119 0  1 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2
nd half visitor 
760 0.041  0.198 0  1 
Minutes injury time 1
st 
half 
760 1.796  1.022 0  14 
Minutes injury time 2
nd 
half 
760 2.822  1.050 0  9 
Yellow cards home  760  1.393  1.207  0  5 
Yellow cards visitor  760  1.838  1.352  0  7 
Red cards home  760  0.063  0.259  0  2 
Red cards visitor  760  0.120  0.337  0  2 
Total player 
substitutions 
760 3.993  1.303 0  6 
Attendance (000’s)  760  33.114  11.099  8.248  67.721 
Attendance/Capacity 760  0.896  0.119  0.314  1.038 
         
Note: A maximum value for attendance/capacity greater than one is due either to a combination of 
heterogeneous data sources or to ground improvements over the season. In fact, Southampton and 
Watford are the only teams in our Premier League data with reported attendances at some games 
greater than the ground capacity. 
 Table 1B:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FIRST DIVISION SAMPLE 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Score difference  1104  0.389  1.637  -6  6 
Score home   1104  1.509  1.222  0  7 
Score visitor  1104  1.120  1.114  0  7 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1
st half home 
1104 0.058 0.238  0  2 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2
nd half home 
1104 0.075 0.267  0  2 
Goals scored in injury 
time 1
st half visitor 
1104 0.039 0.194  0  1 
Goals scored in injury 
time 2
nd half visitor 
1104 0.050 0.218  0  1 
Minutes injury time 1
st 
half 
1104 2.233 1.189  0  14 
Minutes injury time 2
nd 
half 
1104 3.203 1.187  0  10 
Yellow cards home  1104  1.151  1.122  0  7 
Yellow cards visitor  1104  1.647  1.295  0  7 
Red cards home  1104  0.066  0.273  0  2 
Red cards visitor  1104  0.119  0.363  0  2 
Total player 
substitutions 
1104 4.024 1.273  0  6 
Attendance (000’s)  1104  14.793  7.093  0.849  33.027 
Attendance/Capacity 1104  0.655  0.202  0.032  1.047 
         
Note: A maximum value for attendance/capacity greater than one is due either to a combination of 
heterogeneous data sources or to ground improvements over the season. In fact, Portsmouth, Walsall, 
Crewe and Fulham are the only teams in our First Division data with reported attendances at some 
games greater than the ground capacity. Table 2: Regression estimates of the impact of professional referees on second half  
    injury time in the Premier League 
 
Independent variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
      
Constant       3.251*** 
(0.091) 
     3.172*** 
(0.126) 




Score difference     -0.300*** 
(0.120) 
    -0.516***
(0.166) 
    -0.503*** 
(0.159) 
   -0.531*** 
(0.191) 












Yellow cards           0.092*** 
(0.037) 
   0.106** 
(0.044) 




Player substitutions           0.208*** 
(0.044) 
    0.200*** 
(0.054) 
      
Referee Fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Team  Fixed  effects  No No No  Yes 
      
R
2 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.32 
Observations  311 311 311 311 
      
Notes: The dependent variable is the length of injury time in games that ended with a 1 goal difference. 
Score difference is equal to 1 if the home team is ahead by 1 goal before injury time begins, and 0 if it 
is behind by 1 goal.  ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 
per cent levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regression in column (iv) include 
controls for turnover of clubs, table rankings of home teams, the absolute value of the difference in 
ranks, attendance, ratio of attendance to capacity and monthly dummies. 







    
Injury time first 
half 
   
    














  -0.411 
(0.163) 
    
    
Injury time second 
half 
   
    














  -0.314 
(0.159) 
    
Notes: The sample includes games in which either the first half or second half ended with a 1 goal 
difference before injury time begins. Standard errors are in parentheses. The pre-Professional period is 
1999-00 season. The post-Professional period is 2002-03 season. Some differences do not quite sum 
because of rounding. 
 
 Table 4: Marginal effect of professional referees on second half injury time: 
    Premier League versus First Division 
 
Independent variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
      
Premier League    0.245 
 (0.214) 
  0.202 
 (0.223) 
  -0.107 
  (0.301) 






Year    0.834*** 
 (0.182) 
  0.761*** 
 (0.178) 
  0.625*** 
 (0.244) 
























Premier League × Score difference × Year 
 
  0.633** 
 (0.332) 
  0.591* 
 (0.324) 
  0.593* 
 (0.336) 
      
      
Referee Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Team Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
      
R
2 0.29 0.33 0.38 
Observations 763  763  763 
      
Notes: The dependent variable is the length of injury time in games that ended with a 1 goal difference. 
Score difference is equal to 1 if the home team is ahead by 1 goal before injury time begins, and 0 if it 
is behind by 1 goal.  ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 
per cent levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions in columns (ii) and (iii) 
include controls for yellow cards, red cards, substitutions, table rankings of home teams, the absolute 
value of the difference in ranks, and attendance. 
 
 